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KENTUcKY LAW JoURNAL
The Kentucky Court of Appeals took an altogether contrary view
in the principle case. To interpret the court's ruling as holding
wiretap evidence admissible in Kentucky, however, does not neces-
sarily follow. The attachment of the microphone to the telephone was
held not to be a wiretap within the meaning of Federal Communica-
tions Act. Even though the federal rule of evidence does not operate
mandatorily on the states, the court may well disallow evidence gained
by a true wiretap.
In the past, the court of appeals, in its judicial discretion, has
excluded evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment.17 The
court was not at the time bound to do so by rulings of the Supreme
Court. The same policy considerations seem present where there has
been a violation of a federal statute.
George W. Mills
ComImmcLA. LAw-PmvrrY OF CoNTRAcr NECESSARY FOR ImpLiD
WAmrANT.-The plaintiff, a citizen of Kentucky, purchased a re-
frigerator compressor unit from a Kentucky retailer and installed it in
a supermarket that same day. The next day, when the plaintiff
removed his test gauges from the unit, it exploded, causing the plain-
tiff personal injuries. The explosion was attributed to the presence
of defective casting. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the unit,
a Michigan corporation, in federal district court in Michigan to
recover damages for personal injuries. The jury, having been in-
structed to consider two theories, negligence in manufacture and
breach of implied warranty, returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Held:
Reversed and new trial ordered.1 It was error to submit the case to
the jury under the theory of implied warranty. Being a diversity case,
Kentucky law is applicable. Under Kentucky law the absence of
privity between the plaintiff and the manufacturer precludes the
plaintiff from recovering from the manufacturer for breach of implied
warranty. Schultz v. Tecumseh Products, 310 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1962).
The prevailing rule is that "privity of contract" is an essential ele-
ment for recovery on the implied warranty theory.2 Privity of contract
is required even though the action for breach of warranty was
17 Bengi v. Commonwealth, 321 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1959).
1 The court reversed on the ground that if a case is submitted to a jury on
more than one theory of recovery and reversible error is committed in the sub-
mission of one of these theories, a general verdict returned in favor of the
plaintiff must be set aside.2 Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39, 46 (1960).
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REcENT CASES
originaly a tort action.3 The emphasis upon the buyer-seller relation-
ship in commercial transactions and the early social policy of pro-
tecting the manufacturer and seller have focused the attention in tort
cases on privity of contract rather than the forseeability of injury.
This emphasis resulted in courts requiring a contractual relationship
between the manufacturer of a defective product and the injured
party, not only in actions for breach of implied warranty, but also
in actions based on negligence. Beginning with MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,4 the absence of privity no longer precluded recovery by
injured purchasers in actions based on negligence. Subsequent cases
have extended this liability to members of the purchaser's family,
bystanders, and users who are reasonably expected to be affected by
the goods.5 Some jurisdictions have lifted the privity requirement in
food and drink cases.6
The question before the federal district court in the principal case
was the present status of Kentucky law on privity of contract. The
most recent pronouncement of the Kentucky Court of Appeals involved
a boat explosion which resulted in an injured guest's bringing a per-
sonal injury action against the seller of the boat.7 The court of ap-
peals stated where there is no contractual relationship shown between
the guest and the seller of the boat, the seller was not responsible for
the guest's injury under the theory of implied warranty.8 Despite this
clear statement of the Kentucky law on privity in 1958, there was a
dissent in the principal case which contended that the Kentucky law
was uncertain. The dissent relied on dicta in North American Fertil-
izer v. Combs" to the effect that privity may spring from a warranty.10
However, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated its adherence to the
privity requirement in a later case.1 Also, the dissent relied upon
3 Prosser, Torts 507 (2d ed. 1955).
4 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 882, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
5 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 501.
6 Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d
918 (1961); Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
7 Caplinger v. Werner, 811 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1958).
BId. at 203. But see Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.2-318 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
KRS]. This section provides that a seller's warranty, whether e ress or implied,
extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or
who is a guest in his home, if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be effected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty.
9 307 Ky. 869, 212 S.W.2d 526 (1948). The court denied recovery in a
direct suit by the consumer against the manufacturer based on warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose arising by usage of trade.
10 North American Fertilizer Co. v. Combs, 307 Ky. 869, 872, 212 S.W.2d
526, 528 (1948).
1 Caplinger v. Werner, supra note 7.
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C. D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C. Tway Co.,12 in which the Kentucky court
accepted the MacPherson doctrine in negligence cases. Even though
Kentucky has adopted the MacP herson doctrine, which might indicate
a trend toward abolishing privity in the implied warranty cases, the
federal court was required to apply the present Kentucky law.
Several recent decisions have held privity of contract not to be
necessary to an action for breach of implied warranty.13 To what
extent will Kentucky follow these decisions? Kentucky's adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code in 1960 removed the privity require-
ment under certain circumstances. The Code gives members of the
family, household, or guests of the buyer a direct action against the
seller.14 However, the manufacturer-consumer relationship of the
principal case is not affected by this provision.15 Unless the com-
plaining party can bring himself within a specific Code provision, he
must satisfy the privity requirement under present Kentucky case law.
Yet, present economic and social conditions indicate that the more
enlightened view would be to drop the privity requirement. In this
age of advertising, the consumer purchases goods in reliance upon the
manufacturer's ability to produce them free of defects. Kentucky
should extend the express or implied warranty not only to the buyer's
family, household, and guests, but also to the subsequent buyer. The
manufacturers would become more defect conscious and the public
would be guaranteed safer products. Furthermore, manufacturers
are more able to sustain loss and spread the loss throughout society as
a cost of production.
Larry Garmon
ToRTs - Comm3muroY NEGLIGENcE - P oX _ATE CAUSE - "BUT FoR"
RuILE.-Plaintiff pedestrian brought an action against the defendant
motorist to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when struck
by the defendant's automobile at an intersection. The trial court
instructed the jury that if the plaintiff violated any of the duties im-
posed upon him and if such violation on his part caused or helped to
bring about the accident and the resulting injuries, then the law in this
case is for the defendant. On the basis of this instruction the jury
found for the defendant. Held: Reversed. The use of an instruction
12 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956).
'3 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc., 853 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960).
14 KRS 355.2-318.
15 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318, official comment 3.
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